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JURISDICTION OF THE COUfeT 
This is the brief of Salt Lake County opposing a petition 
for certiorari filed by Sandy City, which seeks a review of a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals entered on June 7, 1990. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the Third District 
Court dismissing this action brought by Sandy City. Rehearing 
of the matter was denied by the Court of Appeals on August 6, 
1990. The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to 
review this matter pursuant to Utah Cod^ Ann. 78-2-2(5) and 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The controlling statutes in this case are Utah Code Ann. 
10-1-104(11) and Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418, ^hich read as follows: 
10-1-104(11): 
"Urban development" means a 
housing subdivision involving more than 
15 residential units with an Average of 
less than one acre per residential unit 
or a commercial or industrial develop-
ment for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases. 
10-2-418: 
Urban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within! one-half 
mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory wjiich the 
municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration, if 
a municipality is willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development 
under the standards and requirements set 
forth in this chapter; provided, 
however, that a property owner desiring 
to develop or improve property within 
the said one-half mile area may notify 
the municipality in writing of said 
desire and identify with particularity 
all legal and factual barriers 
preventing an annexation to the 
municipality. At the end of 12 
consecutive months from the filing with 
the municipality of said notice and 
after a good faith and diligent effort 
by said property owner to annex, said 
property owner may develop as otherwise 
permitted by law. Urban development 
beyond one-half mile of a municipality 
may be restricted or an impact statement 
reguired when agreed to in an interlocal 
agreement, under the provisions of the 
Interlocal Co-operation Act. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This case presents the question as to whether there are 
any special or important reasons, as set forth in Rule 46 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to justify Supreme Court 
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
In November of 1987, Sandy City (Sandy) filed a complaint 
in the Third District Court seeking an extraordinary writ and 
declaratory and injunctive relief to void the approval by Salt 
Lake County (County) in October of 1987 of a conditional use 
permit for a Chevron station on 0.7 acres of land located at 
10600 South and 1300 East in the unincorporated area of the 
county commonly referred to as "White City." R. 2-34. The 
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complaint also souglit to void an earlier decision by the Board 
of County Commissioners made in August of 1987 to rezone 4.18 
acres of property which includes the Chevroh parcel. 
Defendants included Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission, Chevron, Po$tero-Blecker, Inc., 
Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot. Chevron is the developer of 
the station at issue. Postero-Blecker act^d as Chevron's agent 
in the land acquisition. Defendants Yeat$s, Priest, Kjar and 
Smoot were the owners of the larger parcel. 
Motions for summary judgment were fi}ed by all defendants 
in January of 1988. R. 75, 125, 1^5. Sandy filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment and B motion to strike 
affidavits and certain other documents filed by Chevron. R. 
173. The certified administrative recordl was filed with the 
District Court in accordance with £n order requiring 
certification entered on March 3, 1988. R.\ 255. ^ 
In March of 1988, the District Court granted defendants* 
motions for summary judgment and deniedl Sandy's motion for 
summary judgment and motion to strike. R. 259. Appendix 
Exhibit C. On April 8, 1988, the District Court entered its 
order of judgment and dismissal. R. 265. Appendix Exhibit D. 
1. The certified administrative record is contained in 
envelopes 1 through 6 of the court record. Each envelope 
contains a numbered index of the documents within the 
envelope. The Chevron record is in envelopes 3 and 4. The 
McDonald's record is in envelopes 1 and 2, and the zoning of 
the original parcel is in envelopes 5 and (J. 
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On June 7, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court judgment. Appendix Exhibit A. Sandy's petition 
for a rehearing was denied on August 6, 1990. Appendix Exhibit 
B. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
1. On April 5, 1987, defendant Yeates applied with Salt 
Lake County to have the original parcel of 4.18 acres rezoned 
9 
from Residential R-l-8 to Residential RM-ZC^* and Commercial C-2 . 
2. The Salt Lake County Planning Commission, after 
hearing the matter, recommended to the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County that the application be 
approved. After hearing the matter, the Board of County 
Commissioners approved the rezoning application on August 5, 
1987. R. 102. 
3. Sandy City failed to appear at the rezoning hearing 
before the County Commission and failed to take any court 
action challenging the rezoning decision until after the 
subsequent conditional use permit was approved. 
4» On August 16, 1987, Postero-Blecker, as agent for 
Chevron, applied with Salt Lake County for a conditional use 
permit to build a Chevron station on 0.7 acres of the original 
parcel. R. 20. 
2. The ZC designation attached certain conditions 
limiting the height of buildinqs and the nature of uses that 
could be developed on the original property. R. 18. 
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5. The County Planning Commission heard the matter on 
September 22, 1987, at which time evidence was presented 
concerning the application. R. 107-111. Sandy appeared and 
objected to the development. The matter was continued by the 
County Planning Commission until October: 13, 1987, at which 
time the application was approved after additional evidence was 
presented. R. 112-115. 
6. Oral evidence presented at the County Planning 
Commission hearings included the followingi 
a. Recommendations in favor Of the application by 
residents in the area. R. 110, 111. 
b. Testimony by representatives of Chevron of a 
need for the service in the area. R. 113. 
c. Recommendations for preliminary approval by the 
Planning staff subject to certain conditions. R. 108. 
d. Testimony in support of the application from 
the White City Community Council and from the United 
Association of Community Councils. R. 110, 
e. Testimony from Chevron officials estimating the 
costs of the project as $175,000.00. R. 108. 
7. On October 21, 1987, th^ Board of County 
Commissioners upheld the Planning Commission decision approving 
the conditional use permit by denying the appeal of Sandy 
City. Envelope 3, Document 4. 
8. The Chevron station, including the underlying land, 
is owned and operated separately from all other development on 
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the northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East, and all 
permits were obtained separately from any other development. 
R. 180. 
9. On December 9, 1987, the Salt Lake County Commission 
upheld the decision of the Planning Commission approving a 
McDonald's restaurant on 1.3 acres of land located within the 
original parcel of 4.18 acres. On June 13, 1988, Sandy filed 
an action against Salt Lake County and McDonald's raising most 
of the same issues it raises herein. Sandy has appealed to the 
Supreme Court an adverse ruling from the District Court in that 
case. The briefs have been filed by the parties and the case 
is awaiting oral argument.3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states 
that certiorari will be granted only for special and important 
reasons. The rule lists the character of reasons which are 
considered special or important. This case, as the remainder 
of this brief will demonstrate, does not fit within any of the 
reasons listed in Rule 46 or within any other similar reasons. 
In addition, many of the issues in this case are now moot since 
3. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, et al. , Case No. 
890211. 
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all defendants except Salt Lake County havte settled with Sandy 
and have been dismissed from the suit. 
POINT II 
SANDY•S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING ANNEXATION 
POLICY ARE MISLEADING AND UNRELATED TO 
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
A. SANDY'S ERRATIC BOUNDARIES ARE NOT RELATED TO THE ISSUES 
IN THIS CASE. 
Sandy argues that its erratic bouhdaries, as shown on 
the map in its petition, are a result of urban development in 
the unincorporated area of the county. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The configuration of Sandy boundaries 
has been determined by Sandy, not the tounty. The erratic 
Sandy boundaries and islands of unincorporated area within 
Sandy4 are a result of gerrymandered annexations by Sandy which 
have excluded unincorporated islands whetfe a majority of the 
property owners refused to annex or where Sandy has reached for 
properties with high sales and property tax base. Sandy's 
erratic boundaries have no relationship t|o the issues in this 
case. 
Service districts are also blame[d by Sandy for its 
boundary problems. No service district isi a party to this case 
4. Prior to the 1975 enactment! 
10-3-2, there was no prohibition agai 
unincorporated islands as a result o| 
prohibition against creation of unincorpo 
annexation is now found in Utah Code Ann. ; 
of former Section 
ist the creation of 
f annexations. The 
rated islands through 
LO-2-417. 
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and service districts are not on trial here. Whether or not 
service districts are beneficial or detrimental to citizens 
also has nothing to do with the issues in this case. 
B. THIS IS NOT AN ANNEXATION CASE. 
Sandy treats this case as an annexation case by arguing 
annexation policy in its petition as justification for review 
by the Supreme Court. However, this is not an annexation case 
and legislative policy does not support Sandy's position in any 
event. 
The argument that the legislature intended that urbanized 
areas should be within cities is true only in unincorporated 
areas where a high quality of urban services are needed. Utah 
Code Ann. 10-2-401(3).5 Obviously, Chevron did not need any 
Sandy services since it chose not to annex at the time of 
development. 
Utah laws governing annexation require that annexations 
be drawn along logical geographic boundaries. Utah Code Ann. 
10-2-414. The annexation act also requires that decisions 
about municipal boundaries and urban development need to be 
made with adequate consideration of the effect of the proposed 
actions on adjacent areas and the interest of other 
5. Contrary to statements in Sandy's petition, counties 
have been granted powers almost identical to cities' to provide 
and separately fund urban-type services. Utah Code Ann. 17-5-1 
through 17-5-88 (Powers and Authorities of Counties); Utah Code 
Ann. 17-34-1 through 17-34-5 (Municipal Services to 
Unincorporated Areas); Utah Code Ann. 10-8-1 through 10-8-89 
(Powers and Authorities of Cities). 
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governmental entities. Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401(6). If Sandy 
annexed this property, it would carve out almost the only 
commercial development within the large unincorporated 
residential area of White City. R. 339. 
The point is, legislative policy with regard to the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 does ndt in any way dictate 
that this small development should be within Sandy City. 
Therefore, Sandy's arguments concerning legislative policy are 
not justification for this Court to grant certiorari review of 
the matter. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE 
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE. 
The complaint in this case alleged that the rezoning and 
conditional use approval by the County of the Chevron property 
were contrary to the County's zoning Ordinance and master 
plan. These allegations were in addition to and separate from 
the allegations concerning the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
10-2-418. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in numerous cases6 that 
courts will not interfere with zoning decisions as long as 
6. Marshall v. Salt Lake Citv, 105 U. Ill, 141 P.2d 704 
(Ut. 1943); Dowse v. Salt Lake City__Cor^ or_at_i_on, 123 U. 107, 
255 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1953); Crestview-Hollac[lay Homeowners ASSIL..JL 
Inc. v. Enqh Floral Company, 545 P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1976); Gayland 
v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (Ut. 1961). 
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there is a reasonable basis for the decision. The Court of 
Appeals applied this standard in its review of the merits of 
the zoning decision and the findings of the Planning Commission 
for the conditional use application. Issues concerning the 
interpretation of the master plan, the impact of development on 
the area, and the need for development were properly considered 
by the Planning Commission and the County Commission and the 
Court of Appeals correctly held that the record supported the 
County's decision concerning such matters. 
Sandy attempts to argue that this standard should not 
have been applied because of the issues concerning the meaning 
of Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418. This argument has no merit since 
the Court of Appeals did not apply this standard to its review 
of such issues. In fact, the Court of Appeals declined to 
decide issues concerning the meaning of 10-2-418, having 
affirmed the District Court on other grounds. 
POINT IV 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION OF 
THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT SANDY FAILED 
TO OBJECT TO THE REZONING IN A TIMELY 
MANNER• 
A. NOTICE OF THE REZONING HEARING MET ALL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. 
Sandy attempts to excuse its failure to appear at the 
zoning hearing for this property by arguing that it did not 
receive adequate notice of the hearing. Notice of the hearing 
was published in the newspaper as required by Utah Code Ann. 
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17-27-14. Envelope 5, Document 2. In Addition, notice was 
posted at the County Government Center, the Whitmore Library, 
and on a telephone pole near the property. Envelope 5, 
Document 3. County staff asked Sandy for a recommendation on 
the rezoning application, to which Sandy rleplied. Envelope 6, 
Document 2, p. 4; R. 248 Comments of Mike Coulam. Therefore, 
Sandy had both actual and constructive notice that the County 
was in the process of rezoning the property. A representative 
of Sandy admitted during the conditional use hearing for the 
Chevron station that Sandy failed to attend the Planning 
Commission and County Commission hearings on the rezoning 
application. No claim was made that it was due to lack of 
notice. R. 109 Comments of Mike Coulam. 
B. SANDY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE ISSUES CONCERNING 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DURING THE REZONING PROCESS. 
In its petition, Sandy claims that there was no "specific 
use" for the property at the time of the rezoning process and 
therefore issues concerning Utah Code AnnL 10-2-418 could not 
have been addressed. It is ironic that &andy now takes this 
position because Sandy argued in its reply brief to the Court 
of Appeals that the entire development was laid out during the 
zoning process.7 Issues concerning the a|pplicabili ty of Utah 
Code Ann. 10-2-418 were well known to Sand^ at the time of tiie 
7. "The property owner's entire development was laid 
out and presented to the County at the tim<b that the commercial 
zoning was requested." Sandy Reply Brief, |p. 12. 
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rezoning process and were raised by Sandy in its letter seeking 
to have the zoning reconsidered by the Board of County 
Commissioners. R. 23. This record supports the Court of 
Appeals' determination that Sandy could have raised the urban 
development issues during the zoning process. 
Sandy also claims that the County entered into an 
agreement or understanding with Sandy that legal issues 
concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 would be addressed at the 
conditional use hearing. The record does not support Sandy's 
contention. The Board of County Commissioners refused to 
rehear the application for rezoning since the rezoning had 
already been approved and the ordinance enacted and published. 
Envelope 5, Document 6. It referred Sandy to the Planning 
Commission because the conditional use application for the 
Chevron station was pending before the Planning Commission at 
that time. This comment can hardly be construed as an 
agreement between the parties as to where jurisdiction lay for 
review of issues concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418. In any 
event, jurisdiction of a court or administrative body over a 
subject matter is not subject to a stipulation or agreement by 
the parties. State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 6 5 6 
P. 2d 998 (Ut. 1982); Bailev v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P. 2d 1043 
(Ut. 19 84); Springville Community District v. Iowa Dept. of 
Public Instruction, 109 N.W.2d 213 (Io. 1961); see also 2 
Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §152. 
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C. SANDY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THE REZONING DECISION 
REVIEWED IN COURT. 
Sandy argues certain zoning enabling| statutes referenced 
in the opinion of the Court of Appeals ape not applicable to 
this case, Whether those zoning statutes are all applicable to 
this specific fact situation makes no difference in regard to 
judicial review of the zoning decision. The point is that 
Sandy had the opportunity for judicial reyiew of the rezoning 
decision and failed to take that opportunity. A declaratory 
judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-33^2 is an appropriate 
action to review rezoning decisions and also to seek an 
interpretation of statutory provisions. Injunctive actions 
brought under Rule 65A of the Utah Ruled of Civil Procedure 
have been used to test the validity of zoning amendments. 
Actions brought under Rule 65B of the J^tah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for writs in the nature of certiorari to the district 
court may also be used to test the validity of zoning 
decisions. Sandy failed to avail itself of any of the above 
remedies to have the rezoning reviewed i^i court in a timely 
manner. 
8. Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp; , 17 U.2d 3 00, 4.1.0 
P.2d 764 (Ut. 1966); Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake 
City., 116 U. 536, 212 P.2d 177 (Ut. 1949). 
9 . Marshall v. Salt Lake City, supr|a. 
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POINT V 
SANDY'S POSITION CONCERNING THE MEANING 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. J 0-2-418 IS UNTENABLE 
AND NEEDS NO FURTHER REVIEW. 
The statement is made several times by Sandy in its 
petition that the estimated cost of the Chevron development 
exceeded $750,000.00.10 What Sandy doesn't make clear is the 
basis for this statement. Sandy's appraisal for the cost of 
the Chevron development included the estimated cost of land, 
fixtures, equipment and furnishings.11 The cost of land has no 
relationship to the impact of a development and would vary 
greatly depending on when the current developer purchased the 
land. If the land had been owned by the developer for a long 
period of time, the cost likely would be much less than the 
cost of the same piece of land purchased recently. Often the 
developer leases the land and there is no actual purchase cost 
or the proposed development may involve an expansion of an 
existing development not involving additional land. Thus, if 
land cost is included in determining cost projections, the 
result would be arbitrary depending on the date and the nature 
of the land transaction and the nature of the development. 
10. Sandy Petition, p. 11. 
11. Sandy's appraisal estimates the Chevron development 
to cost between $660,000.00 and $760,000.00, including land 
costs of $210,000.00. The appraisal includes the cost of 
fixtures, equipment and furnishings. R. 133. 
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Also, it is not reasonable to believe the legislature 
intended that the County speculate on what kind of internal 
fixtures, equipment and furnishings will er^ d up in an office or 
commercial development at the time it has to decide whether or 
not to issue permits. In most cases, this would not even be 
possible. In many situations where the County reviews an 
application for an office building or commercial development, 
the owner does not have any or all of his specific tenants in 
mind. How offices or commercial developments will be furnished 
and equipped is later decided by each tenarit after the building 
has been approved and constructed and the offices leased. 
Often such furnishing and equipment later change as tenants 
change, In most cases, it would be pure speculation for the 
County to attempt to estimate such costs. 
Finally, these issues are not broad issues upon which the 
future integrity of cities depends, as Sandy argues. The 
majority of commercial and industrial developments cost more 
than $750,000.00 regardless of how the cost issues in this case 
are resolved. 
POINT VI 
MANY OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE ARE NOW 
MOOT. 
Sandy, in the prayer of its complaint, asks for a 
judgment declaring the actions of the County approving the 
Chevron development illegal, for an injunction enjoining the 
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issuance of building permits, for an injunction requiring 
removal of improvements or compliance with annexation laws and 
for funds paid to the County because of this development.12 On 
October 3, 1990, all defendants except Salt Lake County and the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission were dismissed from this 
suit based upon a stipulation that the issues were moot with 
respect to those defendants. The settlement agreement requires 
that Chevron initiate proceedings to have the property in 
question annexed to Sandy. ^ 
Since the Chevron gas station is already constructed and 
Chevron has agreed to annex to Sandy, the only issues remaining 
in the lawsuit are Sandy's claim for damages and the prayer for 
declaratory judgment concerning the legal issues in the case. 
The claim for damages is totally without merit. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the County misconstrued the law in 
approving the Chevron development, Sandy suffers no compensable 
damages from the act. If the County had denied the 
development, it is totally speculative as to whether the 
property owners would have annexed to Sandy or proposed an 
alternative development in the County* Even if the owners of 
the Chevron property would have annexed the property in 
12. A copy of the prayer from Sandy's Complaint is 
attached as Appendix Exhibit E. 
13. Copies of the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal and 
the Affidavit of Leonard J. Lewis, counsel for Chevron, 
attached to Suggestion of Mootness filed by Salt Lake County 
are included as Appendix Exhibit F. 
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question to Sandy, Sandy cannot claim that it would have 
approved this development and benefited from the fees and tax 
revenues since it opposed the development, claiming that the 
proposed development was contrary to the Sandy Master Plan.14 
Actually, Sandy will receive an undeserved windfall by 
annexing the Chevron property now. It will receive future 
taxes on a development it would not have approved and one where 
the County provided all the expenses of bufLlding inspection and 
other required development reviews. 
The declaratory judgment action also is no longer 
appropriate since Chevron has now agreed to annex to Sandy 
City. The Supreme Court has consistently held that declaratory 
judgment is subject to the requirement of justiciability 
including the defense of mootness. Mferhish v. Folsom & 
Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Ut. 1982); Halj. v. Fitzgerald, 671 
P.2d 224 (Ut. 1983); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 U.2d 412, 
375 P.2d 756 (Ut. 1962); Hovle v. Monsor^, 606 P.2d 240 (Ut. 
1980) . 
The only exception to the rule is for matters that are 
likely to reoccur which have a wide public concern and would 
otherwise escape judicial review. Merhish y. Folsom, supra. 
Many of the legal issues raised by Sandy in this case 
have been argued and briefed solely by Chevron, and not by the 
14. Testimony of Mike Coulam, Director of Community 
Development of Sandy and Michael Tingey, Chairman of the Sandy 
City Planning Commission, Minutes of County Planning Commission 
for September 22, 1987. R. 107-111. 
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County. These issues include Sandy's Motion to Strike 
Affidavits of Chevron and the issue of willingness to annex 
under Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418,15 It is unclear whether the 
County could even take a position on these issues at this stage 
of the proceedings. 
Finally, this is not a case of wide public concern or one 
where the issues concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 will escape 
judicial review. In fact, the issues concerning the meaning of 
that statute are already before the Supreme Court in the case 
of Sandy City v. McDonald's, No. 89021116, and therefore there 
is no legitimate reason to continue this litigation,, 
CONCLUSION 
The issues in this case have been reviewed by the County 
Planning Commission, the County Commission, the District Court, 
and the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals also reviewed 
each issue now raised by Sandy in its review of Sandy's 
petition for rehearing. 
There is no conflict between the Court of Appeals' 
decision in this case and any other Court of Appeals decision 
or any decision by the Supreme Court which would justify 
further review of this case. The issues in this case 
15. These issues are addressed in the Court of Appeals 
decision on pages 41-44. 
16. The District Court Order in Sandy City v. Salt__Lake 
County/ et al., No. 890211 (McDonald's), is attached as 
Appendix Exhibit G. 
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Sandy failed to raise issues concerning the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 in a timely mannef during the rezoning 
hearing. In addition, many of those issues are now moot. 
Sandy has cited no special and important reasons which would 
justify yet another review of the issues irt this case. 
For these reasons Salt Lake County asks that Sandy's 
petition for a writ of certiorari be deniec^ L 
DATED this /jff day of October, }990. 
DAVID E. YCfCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By /J^t/^^ 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellees Salt 
Lake County and Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission; K. Delyn 
Yeates; R. Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar; Steven 
E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker, Inc.; and 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 880429-CA 
FILED: June 7, 1990 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial court's 
dismissal of its action against defendants Salt 
Lake County, property owners Yeates, Priest, 
Kjar, and Smoot, and developers Postero-
Blecker, Inc. (Postero-Blecker) and Chevron 
USA, Inc. (Chevron). We affirm the trial 
court's dismissal of Sandy City's action. 
This action involves a 4.18~acre parcel of 
commercial property located on the northwest 
corner of 10600 South and 1300 East in uni-
ncorporated Salt Lake County. The property 
abuts Sandy City's boundaries and is located 
within an unincorporated "island" within 
Sandy City's limits. Since 1976. the county 
master plan and Sandy City plans have called 
for rural residential uses of the property. 
In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general 
annexation policy declaration which, among 
other things, delineated twenty-one uninco-
rporated islands within the city boundaries 
which Sandy City was willing to annex, incl-
uding the present parcel. According to Sand> 
City, this policy declaration requires property 
owners to first attempt to annex to Sandy 
City, thereby obviating the County's approval 
for development of commercial property when 
It Lake Counts com • 
the development cost is in excess of S75O,0OO. 
On August 5, 1987, at the property owne 
request, the Salt Lake County Commtssic 
without amending its master plan, adopted 
zoning ordinance which permitted commcrc 
development on the present property, San 
City objected to the rezoning but failed 
appeal the decision.1 
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, t 
agent for the property owners and Chevrc 
applied to Salt Lake County foi a conditior 
use permit to build a Chevron service static 
car wash, and mini-convenience store on 
acres of the property. This application ind 
ated that the estimated value of the proj< 
was 5250,000. The property owners also in 
nded to build a McDonald's restaurant on t 
property. On September 30, 1987, they fii 
another conditional use permit applicati 
which valued the McDonald's project 
approximately S300,000. The property owne 
did not petition to annex the property 
Sandy City. 
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City pro' 
sted the Chevron application, indicating th 
"Sandy City is currently considering annex 
tion of the property and the annexation w 
require an independent consideration 
proper zoning for this property." It also ur 
uccessfully petitioned the Salt Lake Coun 
Commission to reconsider and amend its pi 
viously passed zoning ordinance. 
On October 13, 1987, rhe Salt Lake Coun 
Planning Commission approved the Chevrc 
conditional use application. On October 1 
1987, Sandy City appealed this decision. T! 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, fc 
lowing several public hearings, denied San( 
City's appeal and entered findings of fact. 
Sandy City then appealed the condition 
use decision to the Salt Lake County Comr 
ission, which held a hearing on December 
1987. The Salt Lake County Commissic 
affirmed the Salt Lake County Plannii 
Commission's grant of the Chevron condii 
orr] use permit, finding that the requin 
statutory procedure had been followed ar 
that the grant of the conditional use pern-
was in the community's interest. Sandy Ci 
then brought this action in the district court. 
On January 18, 198S. Salt Lake Coun 
filed with the district court the affidavit < 
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Plannir 
Commission's administrative assistant, ar 
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plannir 
Commission's September 22 and October 1. 
1987 meetings, at which Chevron's condition 
use permit application had been discussed ar 
interested parties had presented evidenc 
Subsequently, Sandy City submitted ar- aff 
davit indicating that the projected cobt o\ tr 
Chevron development was between S660,0( 
to S760,000, and that the cost of the McD< 
| nald's development would be betwee 
I S900,0(»0 and SI, 100,000. Simultaneously. Sa 
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L3ke County submitted the minutes of the 
April 28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission, which involved 
discussion of the zoning change, along with 
Helen Christiansen's authenticating affidavit. 
All panics moved for summary judgment. 
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt Lake 
County's affidavits, alleging that they failed 
to conform to the requirements of rule 56(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Chevron 
responded by filing an affidavit indicating that 
the building value of the proposed Chevron 
station was S175,0O0. 
On February 4f 1988, the day before the 
hearing on Salt Lake County's motion for 
summary judgment, Sandy City's attorney 
moved for additional discovery time pursuant 
to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proc-
edure. 
During the hearing on February 5, 1988, 
Salt Lake County requested permission to 
introduce into evidence the certified record of 
the administrative hearings. These records 
included the previously submitted commission 
minutes, with additional maps and supporting 
materials. Sandy City's counsel objected, 
stating that he did not know what the admi; 
nistrative record contained and, thus, the 
record was prejudicial. The district court 
overruled Sandy City's objection and allowed 
the record to be entered into evidence. On 
February 19, 1988, Salt Lake County, submi-
tted the minutes of the December 9, 1987 
meeting of the Salt Lake County Commission, 
containing the appeal of the conditional use 
permit grant, along with the administrative 
assistant's supporting affidavit. 
Salt Lake County filed the complete certi-
fied administrative record with the district 
court on March 3, 1988. On March 15, i9S8, 
the district court entered its decision, finding 
that the Salt Lake County Planning Commis-
sion had properly issued the conditional use 
permit, and that defendants' actions did not 
violate the annexation statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 1 0 - 2 - 4 1 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . It granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants and 
dismissed Sandy City's action. Subsequently, 
Sandy City unsuccessfully moved for an inj-
unction on the development of the property 
during the pendency of the appeal. It then 
brought this appeal. 
On appeal, Sandy. City challenges the 
summary judgment, first arguing that there 
were substantial issues of material fact making 
summary judgment improper because: (I) Salt 
Lake County untimely submitted the admins-
trative record in violation of rule 6(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Salt Lake 
County's administrative record and affidavits 
were untimely filed in violation of rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules o( Civil Procedure; (3) the 
affidavits and other evidence presented by 
Chevron violated rule 56(e) o( the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate 
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evidentiary tounda[ion. (4) (he ma! court 
erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's rule 
56(f) • motion for further discovery; and (5) 
there were substantial issues of material fact in 
the record. Sandy City's second major assig-
nment of error is that the trial court erroneo-
usly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§10-2-
418 and 10-1-4(11) j (1986) by ruling that (1) 
to preclude urban development of the property 
at issue, Sandy City had to formally declare its 
intention to annex it prior to the occurrence of 
the events leading tb this lawsuit, and (2) the 
Chevron development, and possibly the 
McDonald's development, did not constitute 
"urban development* under section 10-1-
4(11). 
I. FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Before we address Sandy City's contentions, 
however, it is necessary to examine the scope 
of our review in ca^es dealing with summary 
judgment and municipal zoning issues.2 
In reviewing a j summary judgment, an 
appellate court "con£ider[s] the evidence in the 
light most favorablc| to' the losing party, and 
affirm[s] only wheije it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as p any material issues of 
fact, or where, evenl according to the facts as 
contended by the posing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Bhggs v. Hofcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 
(UtahCt.App. 1987)!. 
It is well established in Utah that "courts of 
law cannot substitute their judgment in the 
area of zoning regulations for that of the 
[municipality's] governing body." Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 
P.2d 27, 29 (1965) (fjootnote omitted). Instead, 
the courts afford a comparatively wide latitude 
of discretion to administrative bodies charged 
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as 
endowing their actiobs with a presumption of 
correctness and validity, because of the com-
plexity of factors involved in the matter of 
zoning and the specialized knowledge of the 
administrative body. Cotronwood Heights 
Citizen Ass'n v. Boafd of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 
138, 140 (Utah 1979)| Thus, the courts will not 
consider the wisdom] necessity, or advisability 
or otherwise interfere with a zoning determi-
nation unless "it isi shown that there is no 
reasonable basis to juitify the action taken." Id. 
In a zoning actiop, Utah Code Ann. §10-
9-15 (1986) indicates! that an aggrieved party 
may "maintain a penary action for relief" 
from any decision of the municipal body 
within thirty days of the filing of the decision. 
The Utah Supreme jCourt stated that "(t)he 
statutory language plenary action tor relief 
therefrom' presupposes the continued exist-
ence of the administrative action, thus sugge-
sting an appeal rather than a trial de novo." 
Xnmhos v. Hoard o\f Adjustment. 685 P.2d 
1032, 1034 (Utah |l984). However. "[i)hc 
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nature and extent o( the review depends on 
what happened below as reflected hy a true 
record of the proceedings, viewed in the. light 
of accepted due process requirements." Denver 
<£• Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. r. Central Weber 
Sewer Impiorcmcnt Dist., 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 
P.2d 884, 887 (1955). The supreme court also 
found, in Xanthos. that where a hearing has 
proceeded in accordance with due process 
requirements, the reviewing court can look 
only to the record, which consists of the 
hearing minutes along with the formal findings 
and order. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. 
However, where no record is preserved, and 
there is, consequently, nothing to review, the 
reviewing court may take evidence. Id. While 
this evidence is not necessarily limited .to the 
evidence presented below, the reviewing court 
may not retry the case on the merits or subs-
titute its judgment for that of the municipal 
body. Id. 
Because an administrative record has been 
preserved in the present circumstance, we find 
that this matter should be reviewed on the 
record, and that a de novo trial is inappropr-
iate. 
Under these standards of review, we now 
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial 
court improperly granted summary judgment 
on evidentiary issues. 
A. Admission of Administrative Record 
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake 
County untimely submitted the administrative 
record in violation of rule 6(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure* It argues that rule 
6(d) requires supporting affidavits to be sub-
mitted at the time a party files a motion for 
summary judgment, and that the administra-
tive record is analogous to a supporting affi-
davit. Because the County submitted the 
administrative record during the hearing on 
the motion for summary judgment, rather 
than beforehand, and, consequently, failed to 
give Sandy City notice of the contents of the 
record, Sandy City concludes that the trial 
court should not have considered the evidence 
contained in this record in arriving at its 
summary judgment. On the other hand, the 
County argues that the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure do not set forth any specific procedure 
for certifying an administrative record from a 
county commission to the district court, so 
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it deals 
only with the filing of affidavits. 
In relevant part, rule 6(d) states: 
When a motion is supported by an 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be 
served with the motion; and, except 
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), 
opposing affidavits may be served 
not later than 1 day before the 
hearing, unless the court permits 
them to be served at some other 
time. 
alt Lake Counlv com 
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Prior to the hearing before the district c< 
on February 5. 198S, the County submi 
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plain 
Commission hearings held on April 28, ^ 
12, September 22, October 13, and Octc 
27, 1987, along with authenticating affidav 
These minutes contained testimony on all 
the disputed issues. The record which 
County moved to be placed into evide 
during the district court hearing contai 
these minutes, accompanied by sonic doci 
entation and a large quantity of plat ma 
but did not add materially to the relev 
information already before the court, 
court admitted this record into evidence o 
the strenuous objections of Sandy City, stat 
that "everything down there is not essential 
a determination of these motions. And 1 th 
that quite apart from this, [even] if the co 
disregarded this, it will have before it suf 
ient undisputed facts of law to make decis?< 
in the matter." Subsequently, the court ad 
itted into evidence, as part of the record, 
minutes of the Salt Lake County Commissi 
hearing held on December 9, 1987, which Y 
not previously been available, and varic 
documents that were specifically requested 
Sandy City's attorney. 
Our review of the record, including i 
administrative record submitted to the cou 
indicates that if there was any error in adr 
tting the administrative record, it was harml 
because it was essentially cumulative w 
respect to the evidence already before t 
court. Further, some of the subsequen 
admitted evidence was admitted at San 
City's request. 
However, we find that the trial court c 
not err in admitting the administrative reco 
at the time of trial. If we follow rule 6(d) 1 
erally, styling the administrative record as t 
equivalent of an affidavit in support of 
motion for summary judgment, the documer 
must be served not later than one day befc 
I the hearing unless the court permits them 
be !• Tved at some other time. The court, th 
I refore, has discretion to admit such documer 
J at other times, including during the hearm 
In this case, the court admitted documer 
during and after the hearing, in response 
requests made by both parties. 
However, there are limitations to this dis 
retion. Although the Utah Supreme Court h 
found that the notice provisions of rule 6( 
are not hard and fast, it has stated that a tri 
court may dispense with technical complian 
to them only if there is satisfactory proof th 
a party had "actual notice and time to prepa 
to meet the questions raised by the motion < 
an adversary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah I 
423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footno 
omitted); see also Western States Thrift 
Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 5( 
P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 1 
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Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962). 
Although Sandy City objected to the adm-
ission of the administrative record on the 
ground that it did not know what it contained 
and, therefore, was unprepared to argue 
against it, the trial court properly denied this 
objection because the entire record was a 
matter of public record, had been on Hie for a 
substantial period of time prior to the hearing, 
and both parties had access to it. Further, 
significant portions of the record, in the form 
of the commission minutes, were already 
before the court and Sandy City had ample 
opportunity to become familiar with them. "We 
find no abuse of discretion in the court's 
ruling. 
B. Adequate Evidentiary Foundation 
Sandy City's next claim of error is that the 
affidavits and other evidence presented by 
Chevron and the other defendants violate rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
because they lacked an adequate evidentiary 
foundation. 
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that 
"[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." Inadmissible evidence cannot be 
considered in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 
420, 421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments 
v. Srare Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); so an affidavit which 
does not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) is 
subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank 
of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 64, 498 P.2d 352, 353-
54 (1972); see also Blomquist, 504 P.2d at 
1020-21 (an affidavit containing statements 
made only "on information and belief is 
iasufficient and will be disregarded). 
Sandy City moved to strike defendants1 
affidavits for their failure to conform to these 
requirements. In its motion to strike, Sandy 
City attacked defendant Chevron's memora-
ndum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment and the affidavit of Helen J. Chri-
stiansen, along with its attached exhibits, to 
the extent that they were used to establish the 
allegations set forth in Chevron's memora-
ndum. 
Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits served to 
establish that she was the custodian of the 
record before the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission and that, on the basis of her 
personal knowledge, the hearing minutes and a 
copy of McDonald's Corporation's applica-
tion for a conditional use permit were the 
correct records of the Salt Lake County Pla-
nning Commission. Under rules 902(4) and 
1005 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, public 
records are admissible as an exception to the 
general rule excluding hearsay evidence if they 
are "certified as correct by the custodian." 
Utah R. Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christ-
iansen's affidavit ponformed to rule 56(e) with 
regard to the admission of the exhibits as 
portions of the administrative record before 
the Salt Lake Cqunty Planning Commission. 
As such, they are admissible evidence and are 
not subject to a motion to strike. 
Sandy City challenges various statements 
made in these minutes as being without evid-
entiary foundation. These allegations, 
however, go to the merits of granting the 
conditional use permit and not to any proce-
dural defects. Therefore, we are not concerned 
with them undef our standard of review. 
Consequently, we'find Sandy City's objections 
to the foundation of statements made in the 
record to be withofit merit. 
C. Further Discovery 
Sandy City argues that the district court 
erred in refusing to permit it to conduct 
further discovery "pursuant to rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of tivil Procedure. Rule 56(0 
provides that a court may continue a motion 
for summary judgment to permit the moving 
party to obtain affidavits or take depositions. 
Hunt v. Hursu 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
Rule 56(0 reads ai follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that 
he cannot for reasons stated present 
by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depos-
itions to be ^aken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order 
as is just. 
It is generally held that rule 56(0 motions 
should be granted liberally to provide adeq-
uate opportunity for discovery, Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), Ca7-
lioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 
841 (Utah Ct. A^p. 1987); because informa-
tion gained during discovery may create 
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. Downtown 
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, courts are 
unwilling to "spkre the litigants from their 
own lack of diligence," CaUioux, 745 P.2d at 
841 (quoting He^err v. Wicklund, 1U F.2d 
218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)), so do not grant rule 
56(0 motions when dilatory or lacking in 
merit. Reeves v. Ceigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
764 P.2d 636, ^39 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Downtown Athletic Club, 740 P.2d at 278-
79. 
A rule 56(0 movant must file an affidavit to 
preserve his or her contention that summary 
judgment should be delayed pending further 
discovery. CaUioux. 745 P.2d at 841. In this 
affidavit, the movant must explain how the 
requested continuance will aid his or her 
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opposition to summary judgment. Id. The trial 
court has discretion to determine whether the 
reasons stated in a rule 56(0 affidavit arc 
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639. 
Sandy City filed an affidavit with the court 
along with its rule 56(f) motion, stating that it 
had been unable to take defendants* deposit-
ions or to obtain a certified copy of certain 
county commission minutes. It indicated that 
it wanted to pursue additional discovery which 
would show that: (1) the proposed use of the 
property contradicted the county master plan 
and that insufficient evidence had been pres-
ented to the County Planning Commission to 
demonstrate conformity with the plan; (2) the 
proposed zoning would not contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood; (3) 
the proposed use would be detrimental to the 
health, safety, and general welfare of persons 
residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope, 
costs, and impact of the development was not 
accurately and fully communicated to the 
county officials during the decision-making 
process; and (5) the costs of the development 
would substantially exceed $750,000. 
To determine whether this affidavit was 
sufficient to merit a rule 56(0 continuance, 
several factors must have been considered: 
(1) Were the reasons articulated in 
the Rule 56(0 affidavit "adequate" 
or is the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought merely 
on a "fishing expedition" for purely 
speculative facts after substantial 
discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant 
evidence? (2) Was there sufficient 
time since the inception of the 
lawsuit for the party against whom 
the summary judgment is sought to 
use discovery procedures, and 
thereby cross-examine the moving 
party? (3) If discovery procedures 
were timely initiated, was the non-
moving party afforded an approp-
riate response? 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 764 
P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club, 740 
P.2d at 278. 
In determining if Sandy City's request for 
further discovery was meritorious, we first 
consider the relevant standard of review. As 
we noted above, in municipal zoning decis-
ions, the courts do not consider the wisdom, 
necessity, or advisability of particular actions. 
See Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, 652 
P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Utah 1982). Instead, the 
reviewing court may consider whether the 
municipality acted in conformance with its I 
enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant to I 
its comprehensive plan. Naylor v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-
29 (1965). The court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the municipality on the 
ll Lake Count> CODE«CC 
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merits of these issues, however. Id. at 129. 
The trial record contained evidence as tc 
Sail Lake County's enabling statutes, ordin-
ances, and plans. It also indicated that the Sail 
Lake County Commission considered evidence 
with respect to all the issues on which Sandy 
City wished to perform additional discovery, 
The Salt Lake County Commission made 
findings of fact going to the merits of these 
issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the 
issues was improper under the standard oi 
review, but could properly be held with respect 
to enabling statutes and procedural issues. 
However, there was already substantial evid-
ence on the record regarding the relevant 
enabling statutes and plans. Further, Sand) 
City did not allege in its affidavit that it 
needed additional time to discover procedural 
errors committed by Salt Lake County ir 
granting the conditional building permit. 
Therefore, we find that the trial court could 
reasonably conclude that the reasons Sandy 
City articulated in its affidavit would produce 
only cumulative evidence and, so, were inad-
equate to merit a continuance under rule 56(f). 
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time and 
opportunity during the pendency of the action 
before the county commissions to develop and 
present evidence in its favor and to determine 
and refute the defendants' evidence. The 
record indicates that on August 5, 1987, the 
Salt Lake County Commission adopted the 
zoning ordinance allowing commercial devel-
opment on the property at issue, following 
hearings on the issue held in April and May of 
1987. Sandy City objected to the rezoning at 
this time but failed to appeal. On August 26, 
1987, Postero-Blecker applied for the 
Chevron conditional use permit. Sandy City 
protested the application on September 18, 
1987, and subsequently was involved in several 
public hearings on the issue before both the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission and 
the Salt Lake County Commission, at which it 
had ample opportunity to present evidence. 
S«.rtfy City appealed to the district court in 
December 1987. The hearing on the summary 
judgment motion was finV.ly held on February 
5, 1988, nearly a year after the initial zoning 
hearings had taken place. As stated previously, 
the court will not use a rule 56(0 motion to 
shield the movant from his or her lack of 
diligence. 
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion, 
(t]he mere averment of exclusive 
knowledge or control of the facts 
by the moving party is not adeq-
uate: the opposing party must show 
to the best of his ability what facts 
are within the movant's exclusive 
knowledge or control; what steps 
have been taken to obtain the 
desired information pursuant to 
discovery procedures under the 
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Rules; and that he is desirous of 
taking advantage of these discovery 
procedures. 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J. 
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's 
Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)). 
Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with 
these requirements. Therefore, we conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discr-
etion in denying Sandy City's rule 56(0 
motion. 
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Sandy City argues that the court failed to 
consider evidence which created the following 
genuine issues of material fact: (1) Sandy 
City's willingness to annex, as shown by its 
express declaration in its annexation policy 
declaration and its attorney's statements 
before the Salt Lake County Planning Com-
mission; (2) that the projected cost of the 
Chevron project exceeded $750,000, as shown 
, by a certified appraisal setting the cost as 
between S660.000 and 5760,000; (3) that the 
I Chevron station was only pan of a larger 
I scheme to develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in 
that the Chevron station would take only 1/6 
of the parcel, the property owners* represe-
nted that the property would be a "commercial 
subdivision/ and that they would be the sole 
developers of the entire tract; (4) that the cost 
for the entire development, excluding the cost 
of the land, would exceed $750,000; and (5) 
the development was not in compliance with 
the county master plan and county ordinances 
which called for rural use of the subject pro-
perty, and would create traffic hazards and 
planning problems. 
Many of these issues are actually issues of 
law. The only issues of fact are the projected 
cost of the project and whether the proposed 
development was in compliance with the 
county master plan and county ordinances. As 
we have noted above, these issues were disc-
ussed and evidence was presented before the 
county commissions, which entered written 
findings and decided them on their merits. 
Because their findings were supported by evi-
dence, we do not disturb them on review. See 
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 
883, 885-86 (Utah Ct. A p p . 1989) 
(administrative agency's factual findings will 
not be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary and 
capricious"). 
II. LEGAL ISSUES 
We next address Sandy City's contention 
that the trial court erred in its interpretation 
and application of Utah Code Ann. §10-2-
418 (1986) and §10-1-4(11) (1986). Because 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free 
to reappraise the trial court's legal conclus-
ions. Bonhum v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 
8, 9 (19S9) (per curiam); Parents Against 
Drunk Drivers v. Cray stone Pines Homeo-
wner's Ass'n. 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Ct. 
App. 1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. 
Kirton, McConkie jfc Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1990). 
A. Annexation Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 prohibits 
urban development "within one-half mile of 
a municipality in the unincorporated territory 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if 
a municipality is Willing to annex the terri-
tory proposed for such development under the 
standards and requirements set forth in this 
chapter." (Emphasjs added.) The parties dis-
agree as to whether Sandy City, to prevent 
urban development in the disputed territory, 
was required unddr this statute to formally 
declare its intention to annex the territory 
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit. 
Utah Code An i^. §10-2-414 (1986) req-
uires a municipality, prior to annexing uninc-
orporated territory of more than r^c acres, to 
adopt a policy declaration indicating the sta-
ndard "under which^  it is willing to annex the 
territory. Sandy City argues that it expressly 
declared its willingness to annex the property 
before initiation of] the present lawsuit by (1) 
promulgating a general policy declaration 
indicating its willingness to annex the prop-
erty, if petitioncdj along with twenty other 
parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement 
to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
that it was willing o^ annex the property. The 
trial court found that Sandy City was obliged 
to make a formal declaration of intent to 
annex, in addition to its general policy decla-
ration, to invoke the protection of section 10-
2-414. 
Even though Sindy City, in its master 
policy declaration, had indicated its interest in 
annexing the property should the property 
owners so petition, the property owners never 
petitioned, nor did Sandy City attempt to 
annex the property on its own. Further, it did 
not appeal the county's.initial zoning decision 
pursuant to Ut^h Code Ann. §10-9-9 
(1986), and raise this Issue at that time. 
Instead, it waited to raise the issue on the 
subsequent grant of the conditional use 
permit, where the relevant issues do not 
include the proposed use of the land or any 
annexation issue, put only whether the prop-
osed use comports with the previously enacted 
zoning regulations and county master plan. 
Because Sandy Cijy could and should have 
raised this issue easier, we find that it is pre-
cluded from raising it now. Sere Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto U'ok'S, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, we do not 
address the issue of whether Sandy City was 
required under section 10-2-418, in addition 
to its master policy declaration, to officially 
declare its willingness to annex a territory of 
less than five acre^ s.4 Consequently, we find 
Sandy City's objection to be without merit. 
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We affirm the trial court's finding against 
Sandy City on this issue, even though we 
assign a totally different rationale than that 
used by the trial court. Sec, e.g.. Ostler v. 
Ostler, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
B. Urban Development 
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 (1986) states 
that "(ujrban development shall not be appr-
oved or permitted within one-half mile of a 
municipality in the unincorporated area which 
the municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration.'" "Urban 
development" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§10-1-104(11) (1986) as "a housing subdi-
vision involving more than 15 residential units 
with an average of less than one acre per res-
idential unit or a commercial or industrial 
development for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases.m 
Pursuant to its objective of preventing the 
proposed development of the disputed terri-
tory, Sandy City argues that the trial court 
erred in finding the value of the proposed 
development did not exceed $750,000 because 
(1) the definition of "urban development" 
under section 10-1-104 includes not only the 
value of the building itself, but also the cost 
of the land and the value of the building fix-
tures; and (2) the $750,000 figure encompasses 
all commercial ventures to be built on the 
disputed territory. Salt Lake County, on the 
other hand, alleges that the only relevant cost 
under the definition is that of the building 
alone and does not include the land and buil-
ding fixtures, and that the $750,000 figure 
applies to each individual development venture 
separately initiated on the property. 
Again, because Sandy City has not made 
any attempt to annex the territory and should 
have raised its objections to urban develop-
ment at the time of the zoning determination 
rather than at the subsequent granting of a 
conditional use permit, we decline to interpret 
this statute. Because the interpretation of 
section 10-2-414 would have no relevance to 
the propriety of the county's grant of a con-
ditional use permit under our standard of 
review, any interpretation we would make 
would be an advisory opinion, which we 
decline to issue under well established stand-
ards of judicial review. See Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where the result in 
the prior action constitutes the full relief 
available to the parties on the same claim, or 
where the issue could and should have been 
litigated in the prior action, the claim is pre-
cluded under the doctrine of res judicata); 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 
32, 33 (Ct. App. 1990) (there is a longstanding 
judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory opi-
nions). Therefore, we find this issue to be 
without merit. 
Regnal W„ Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. §17-27-16 (1987). a 
appeal from a zoning decision must be made withi 
the time and according to the procedure specified b 
the board of county commissioners. While thes 
regulations are not a pan of this record, there is n 
dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezonin 
pursuant to these regulations. 
2. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes an 
characterizes some of the issues as annexation 
related, however this appeal is from the grant of 
conditional use permit, a zoning function. 
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings state 
in part: 
1. The estimated cost of the develop-
ment is approximately $ 175,000 
2. This development is consistent with 
the intent of the Salt Lake County 
Master Plan by placing commercial 
development at major intersections 
within the county. The Little Cotton-
wood District Plan was generally inte-
nded to be applicable through 1985 and 
the map is now outdated in this imme-
diate area. Since the adoption of the 
plan in 1976, Sandy City rezoned the 
northeast corner of 10600 South 1300 
East to commercial, which changed the 
character of the intersection. Additional 
commercial development is now appro-
priate at this intersection and is consis-
tent with the existing development app-
roved by Sandy City. 
3. The development will provide 
additional gasoline services which are 
needed and desirable in the neighbor-
hood and community.... 
4c The development is buffered from 
adjacent residential uses by property 
zoned R-M and will not be detrimental 
' to the health, safety or general welfare 
of persons residing or working in the 
vicinity or injurious to property or 
improvements in the vicinity. The traffic 
engineer has reviewed and approved the 
application. Upon compliance with the 
conditions required by the Planning 
Commission, the development will be an 
attractive addition to the community. 
5. The proposed use will comply with 
the regulation and conditions of the 
Zoning Ordinance. 
4. We note that the property at issue 
consists of 4.18 acres while section 10-
2-418 applies to parcels consisting of at 
least five acres. Therefore, section 10-2-
418 would be inapplicable in the present 
case. 
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Sandy City, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Salt Lake County, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission; K. Delyn Yeates; 
R. Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar; 
Steven E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker, 
Inc.; and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
lORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 880429-CA 
Salt Lake County Third 
District Court C87-07304 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 26, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this l£_ '4 day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
/U&MU 
Mary T.yNoonan, Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
was deposited in the United States mail, 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, UT 34070 
Leonard J. Lewis 
Attorney for Respondent, Chevron, IKS.A. 
50 South Main St., Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kent S. Lewis 
Salt Lake Co. Attorney's Office 
2001 So. State St., Suite #3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
Attorney for K. Delyn Yeates, 
R. Scott Priest, W. Scott Kjar, 
Steven E. Smoot, and Postero-Blecker, Inc., 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 6th day of August, 1990. 
By ' " ^ v r V ~ I ~rf£/ 
y-^ Deputy Clerk 
sai l Laxe ^ounxy uian 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRl} JUDICIAL DIS^TGf,erK 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7304 
Plaintiff's and defendants1 Motions for Summary Judgment 
came before this Court .on the 5th day jof February, 1988. All 
parties were represented by respective dounsel. After argument, 
the Court took the matter under advisement. On the 25th day of 
February, 1988, Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification of 
Record came before this Court. The matter was taken under 
advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record. After 
reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the Court 
finds as follows. 
1. Salt Lake County Commission acjted properly in rezoning 
the property in question, and was not in violation of any county 
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived its 
right to object to rezoning. 
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2. Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake 
County Commission properly issued a conditional use permit for 
development of the subject property. The project, based on the 
facts, is necessary and desirable, and not detrimental to the 
general welfare. Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated 
acted properly in processing its application through the only 
body with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County. Sandy City 
did not have jurisdiction to accept the application. 
3. Defendants' actions do not violate Utah Code Ann,, 
Section 10-2-418. 
(a) Defendants1 development does not constitute "urban 
development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area. 
(b) Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex 
the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation. 
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated 
that it would annex the subject property. Even if Chevron 
petitioned for annexation and Sandy City annexed, there is no 
assurance Sandy City would approve Chevron's application. 
Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for 
annexation. 
(c) The value of the fixtures and personal property 
should not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000.00. Furthermore, the 
application of Chevron should be considered a single development. 
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(d) Even if Chevron's application were not considered 
a single development, and were combined with McDonald's project, 
the project will still not exceed $750,opo.OO. 
(e) At this time Chevron ha$ taken all the necessary 
procedures for approval of their application, and is ready to 
proceed with their project, 
4. Based on the facts before the Court, it appears that 
Salt Lake County Commission has conducted a hearing that 
comported with all due process requirements. It appears to have 
acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearings, 
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted in 
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 
231 (1976). 
5. Accordingly, it is the opiniori of this Court that Sandy 
City's Motion to Strike should be denied}/ and Sandy City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be denied. Furthermore, all of the 
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Certification should be granted. Counsel for 
defendant Chevron is to prepare an Ordeif for the Court's 
OOL^ 
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signature. Said Order should be approved as to fora by all 
parties. 
Dated this s ~> — day of March, 1988. 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
H.|OiXC^ |-!;?::;:,_£Y 
i \ -
OCC265 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this \ >-> day of March, 15(88: 
Walter R. Miller 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84 070 
STATE OF UTAH ) 38 
Kent S. Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County Defendant^ 
2001 S. State, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
, I. THE UNDCTSIGNfiO. CLERK OF THE OKTW 
COURT OF SAJ.T LAKE COUNTY UTAH, CO HERE 
CSaTlfY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FCREGOTKC 
4 TRUE AHO FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DO( 
IkfENT ON PILE \HMY OFFICE A3 SUCH CLERK<-
WJTNfcSS MY HA>i^r4Qla€Al iWl 'AI0 C0C 
TJHJS-U— DA; . 
H QIXON HM^EY) a.|RK 
Leonard J, Lewis 
John W. Andrews 
Attorneys for Defendant Chevron 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Attorney for Defendants Yeates, Priest, 
Kjar and Smoot 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
00C2£3 
E x h i b i t D 
FILED IN CLEPKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake Cou *y -••"1^ 
APRJ2 ^ 88 
f'H.b«onH./.cliev Of*»o J V ^ i " -
V '• _ V i_ • ' - v .' 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947 
John W. Andrews, #4724 
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SM00T, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A. , INC. , 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-7304 
Honorable Raymond Uno 
The following matters came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th 
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt 
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and 
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
Motion For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintijff Sandy City's 
Motion To Strike. Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews 
appeared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.k., Inc.; Kent S. 
Lewis appeared on behalf of defendants Salt iLake County and 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission; Brintoln R. Burbidge 
appeared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjarj, Priest and 
Yeates; and Walter R. Miller appeared on behalf of plaintiff 
Sandy City. 
The Court having reviewed the record and the memoranda 
and arguments of the parties, and good caus^ appearing, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
(1) P-laintiff Sandy City's Motion For Summary 
Judgment and Motion To Strike are denied; 
(2) It appearing that no material issues of fact 
exist, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby 
granted. It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of 
Sandy City in this action and all causes of action contained 
therein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
..j 
DATED this •£_ day of April, 1988
 h 
^ ^ BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST
 0 r\ /f /, 
K DIXON H W-pV ^ ^ ^ ' ^ A / ^ ^ ' ^ ^ -
C"«'V-. ' V , ^ ; \>\ i i ' j i L Raymond S. Uno 
» V r - ^^(r r — T T T D i s t r i c t Judge T X . Deputy C~)<* 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAN 
& MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq. 
John W. Andrews, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
1600 
<Z/^/7f^L 
Walter R. Miller, Esq. 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent S. Lewis, Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Defendants 
2001 South State Street 
#53600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
KIRT0N, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeates 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
5747A 
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Exhibit E 
37- the City has exhausted all administrative remedies 
and no oth^r plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists. 
3®# the City is entitled to the remedies hereafter set 
forth in i^g Prayer for Relief. 
SSSSSVATZCW OF CZftZXS 
39° ^he City hereby expressly reserves the right to assert 
other and £urther claims against the County and its Planning 
Commission
 arising out of or in connection with its conduct with 
respect t^ ^he Property or their annexation and taxation 
policies ^s ancj when such claimte may arise or become 
ascertainable whether at law or in equity, that may or may not 
be subject
 t o t h e utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHERE^0RE> t h e c i t y p r a y s the Court grant relief as 
follows: 
*• ^or judgment declaring that t^ he actions of the County 
and its banning Commission in making the proposed development 
possible w^re niegal and void; 
2
- ^or a prohibitive injunction and extraordinary writ 
enjoining
 t h e issuance or obtaining of a building permit or 
other auth^rizations o r approvals froiq the County related to 
development}
 o f t h e property or bu|ildings or improvements 
thereon; 
or a mandatory injunction and extraordinary writ 
requiring Defendants to remove any building or improvements 
constructed
 o n t h e property or to comply with annexation laws 
11 
relating to urban development and bring the Property into 
compliance with Sandy City Development Codes. 
4. For an accounting of all funds heretofore and 
hereafter paid to the County and arising from development, use, 
or ownership of this property and improvements thereon; 
5. For an injunction and extraordinary writ requiring (1) 
payment of the funds specified in the foregoing paragraph, or 
equivalent funds, to plaintiff; (2) reimbursement to plaintiff 
of all reasonable expenses incurred as a result of illegal 
actions by defendants; and (3) compliance by defendants in all 
respects with provisions of the state annexation statute. 
6. For interest, costs and such other relief as may be 
appropriate at the time of judgment. 
DATED this^£_ day of November, 1987. 
WALTER R. MILLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
12 
.D^II-LJJJ.1, r 
DAVID E. YOCOM (3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Kent S. Lewis (1945) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Salt Lake County and Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3420 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COl^ RT 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, K. DELYN YEATES, 
R. SCOTT PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC. and CHEVRON 
U.S.A., INC., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEONARD J. LEWIS 
Court of Appeals 
No. 8$0429-CA 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
ss 
LEONARD J. LEWIS, being first dufLy sworn upon oath, 
states as follows: 
1. I am legal counsel for Postero-Blecker, Inc. and 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in the captioned matter. 
2. All defendants except Salt Lake County have entered 
into a settlement agreement with Sandy City which resulted in 
dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to all 
defendants except Salt Lake County. 
3. As part of the settlement agreement, Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. agreed to annex to Sandy City 1.24 acres of land 
located at approximately 10600 South and 1300 East which 
includes the land upon which the Chevron service station is 
located, 
4. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. has filed with Sandy City a 
petition to annex the above-described property to Sandy City. 
A copy of said petition js/attached hereto 
lis ((x ^%ay of October, 1 DATED thi 990. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this A %C day of 
October, 1990. 
My Commission Expires 
R1086 
NOTARY PUBLIC _ 
Residing at \£*M* Xl/1^ d^j *-J/~ /P> 
StftrftMi j -2-
The Honorable Lawrence P« 
Mayor of Sandy City 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Smith 
P E T I T I O N 
The undersign 
real property 
value of the 
assessment ro 
corporate lim 
Sandy City Co 
approximately 
South, Range 
and described 
Appendix f,Alf 
ed, constituting a majority 
and the owners of not less 
real property, as shown by i 
lis, lying and contiguous t\ 
its, desire to annex and hei 
rporation to accept annexati 
4.44 acres of land in Sect] 
1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
on the plat map and legal 
and f,BM to this petition. 
of the owners of 
than one-third in 
.he last 
Sandy City 
'eby petition 
on and zoning of 
.on 17, Township 3 
[eridian, as shown 
iescriptions on 
The undersigned also petition Sandy City to accept 
Neighborhood Commercial (CN) or Community Commercial (CC) 
zoning of such properties. Petitioners Reserve the right 
to withdraw their annexation petition if such zoning is 
not approved. 
Petitioner: Date: Address of Property: 
Chevron U.S^A. I n c . 
By. C A7 ^ L 
1297 East 10600 South 
10/1/90 Sal t LaHe County, Utah 
Resolution Trust Corporation, as conservator for 
Williamsburg Federal Savings and Loan 
By_ 
John Baker, Financial 
Institution Specialist 
1225 Easjt 10500 South 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
McDonald's Corporation 
By. 
10550 Sojuth 1300 East 
Salt LaJqe County, Utah 

5" 
Legal Description of Prcperty to 3e Annexe to Sand/ City; 
S t q i r n i n q i t a p a ; * t N CC^36 ' 00 ' ? -0 ^991 ir.d *l Q S o c g . ^ ^ 50 ' t * t f - « . r : h * 
East q u a r t * - cc - r» r £* S t c t i c n ! * \ T3S. PlS, SL &S»?1: anc r Lnnn<; thsr ra 
M ^ 3 S ' C 0 " £ 6^0.3 ' s e t alc^q t r? * 3 -U l i r e of IJS'X1 Eds: S t ress : tns icc 
N 3?^5£ '3 l u U 27'-*.^ f a c t : t^i*nc« 
S Q°39'C0"U 33-07 f * « t te ths ME c2 -«w of Whit© C i t y ^27 subd iv is ion : shancs 
f a t t e n i n g t n * £ l in© af said s u b - i v i i i o n 
S 0 I °43 '29"W ^35.^5 fmmt: th9*ZB l i v i n g said su£ l i r a *r£ running a l c r g ihQ 
>4 RCU l i *n* or" 10600 Sfiuth S:"©*: 
S 89 0 56 r 31"£ 356.31 fea t to t *9 oa:-.» £f bacinr. i^g. 
Includes a l l o ' pa rce ls : 
28 -17 -230-014 O.S *^ a c r t i C>«vron 
29 - i7~2£C-0 lS 0.70 ac-»« Ch#vr*n 
2 8 - 1 7 - 2 S C - 0 1 * 1.64 acr *s 'Ji 11 iam«ourg S 4 * i n $ * Sank 
28-17-2SC-017 1.34 acrs< McDonald* 
t o t A l i 4.4<* i c r f i 
COX^^CIAL DISTRICTS 
15-0-4 PLLNTIED CEJrrSR/SSIGESORHOOD DISTEICT CS 
(a) Pnrpoae^ The CN district allows for the creation of 
coaa&Arcial centers to serve the convenience shopping and 
service oeads of neighborhood areas o£ Sandy City0 The 
Neighborhood Censac District designation is intended for 
cotosiercial developments thj.fi vill relate co residential 
neighborhood* ace vill ha compatible with residential 
character. 
(h) Prerequisites for District Designation. Tor a parcel to 
qua J1 fy for CN District designation, it shall comply with the 
following: 
(1) A parcel shall he at least 3 contignous acres in else 
acd no greater than 10 acre* in land axe*« Parcels M T 
he added to an existing CN District, if, however, such 
addition increases a district to greater than 20 teres, 
the enlarged district may qualify for CC deeignation. 
(2) A Of District shall he located on at least a cajor 
collector street, preferably at one quadrant of an 
intersection of such streets, and in a location that is 
conveniently accessible from its service area. 
(3) An applicant for a CST District designation shall have 
completed the pre-application conference for site plan 
review. Section 15-22-2(b), 
(4) An applicant fcr CN designation nay be required by the 
Director of Cocsnunity Development co submit an analysis 
of the potential fiscal impact for the proposed 
neighborhood center« The analysis shall be prepared by 
a person or organization that is professionally 
qualified to perform fiscal analysis. 
(5) In the even* that no substantial construction of the 
neighborhood center is tmdervay after one year from the 
date of ieenanca of the son* change, the Director of 
Ceomualey Development may recommend to the City Council 
thee the CT designation revert to the previous 
designation or that the district be merged with an 
abutting district, 
(c) Uses Allowed, A Commercial Center, neighborhood Chapter 
13*2, la allowed a* a conditional use* Upon completion of 
site plan review and Issuance of a Conditional Use Permit, 
the following shall be allowed ae pemitted ueeet 
CI) Athletic, Tennis, or Health Club 
(2) Automotive Self-service Station 
(3) Automotive Service Station 
(4) Business or Financial Services 
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COEMZRCLAL DISTRICTS 
(5) Commercial Recall Sales and SerHces 
(6) Commercial School 
(7) tfedic-ai and Health Care Offices or Facilities 
(8) Public Service 
(9) Recreation Center 
(10) Recreation, Indoor 
(11) ReLLfcicus or Cultural Activity 
(12) R*staurmt 
(13) Alcoholic Beverage Class A 
The follcwtng uses may be allov^d but shall require a 
separate Conditional Use Permit; 
(1) Arcade (Rafer to Sandy City Arcade Ordinance) 
(2) Thaatre, C O M art Hall 
(3) Industry, Ugkc 
(4) Public Utility Station 
(5) Restaurant with Drive-up Vindow 
(6) Any use that la not integr*t«d| with the planned canter 
or which occapiea a separate loc or its own street 
frontage. 
(7) Alcoholic Beverage Class B 
(8) Alcoholic Beverage Class D 
(9) Alcoholic Beverage Class E 
(10) Alcoholic Beverage Entertainment 
(11) Automotive Service Station 
(12) Park and Ride Facilities 
Location Restriction. if tha building containing tha usa 
or accessories thereto located within 250 feet of a 
reaidantially toned district, the following use shall ha 
conditional or not permitted as indicatad below. 
C - indicates tha usa requires a Conditional Use Permit 
H - indicates tha usa is not permitted 
C - (1) Automotive Self-Service Station 
C «• (2) Antoaotiva Sarvice Station 
C - (3) Recreation Center 
C * (4) lieoholie Bavarage Class A 
H - (5) Axsnsamant Arcade 
I - (6) Thaatre, Concart Hall 
IT - (7) Restaurant with Drive-up Wlndbv within 100 feat of a 
dwelling or tha probabla location of a dwelling on 
existing rasidentially zoned property. 
Dirvalopaant Standards* A Neighborhood Coamarcial Centar 
shall be developed in compliance witty raqirtrsaanta of Section 
15-13-3, Planaad Cantar Standards. 
guj1H-fng Height. Buildings shall be araetad to a height of 
no greater than 35 faet for any part in t and ad for huaan 
occupancy. 
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OCT 2 1990 
Clerk, Supreme Court, UU 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, 
K. DELYN YEATS, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC. and CHEVRON 
U.S.A. INC., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
STIPULATED MOTION TO 
DISMISS SPECIFIED 
PARTIES AND ORDER 
Case No. 900425 
Argument Priority 
No. 16 
Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Petitioner Sandy City and Respondents 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., K. Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. 
Scott Kjar, Steven E. Smoot, and Postero-Blecker, Inc., 
hereby stipulate that all the issues in the above-entitled 
petition are mooted with respect to said Respondents, and 
move that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be dismissed 
with prejudice with respect to these named Respondents, 
each party to bear its or his own costs. 
This stipulated motion is not intended to suggest 
dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with 
respect to Respondents Salt Lake County or the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission. 
DATED this 2nd day of October,, 1990. 
/ 
Walter R. Miliar 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Petitioner 
<%t 
Leonard J.Lewi 
-Attorney for Rej 
U.S.A. Inc. a 
Blecker, Inc 
fp0nr5€nts Chevron 
Irltr Postero-
Brinton R. Burb 
Attorney for 
Yeates, R. 
Scott Kjar, 
idge 
Respondents K. Delyn 
Scptt Priest, W. 
and Steven E. Smoot 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing stipulated motion, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ^bove-entitled 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari is dismissed with 
prejudice with respect to Respondents Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
K. Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Sc^tt Kjar, Steven E. 
Smoot, and Postero-Blecker, Inc., each ?uch party to bear 
its or his own costs. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
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is not dismissed with respect to Respondents Salt Lake 
lanning££ma«:ssion. County and the Salt Lake County P  Commi
DATED this ,^ s day of 
*>Ort^ 
m-r Gordon R« Hall-
Ghigy-Justice 
Utah Supreme Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 2nd 
day of October"/ 1990, he caused to be mailed to: 
Kent Lewis, Esq. 
Attorney for the Defendants Salt Lake 
County and Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission 
County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, #S 3600 
184190-1200 Salt Lake City, Utah 
a copy of the within and foregoing Sti 
Dismiss as between Sandy City and 
U.S.A. Inc., K- Delyn Yeates, R. Scott 
Kjar, Steven E« Smoot, and Postero-
pulated Motion to 
Chevron 
Priest, W. Scott 
, Inc. 
Respondents 
Daniel W. Anderson, A0080 
Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm, A4570 
Diane H. Banks, A4 966 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Tnird Judicial District 
\ 1989 
• C - C J ' J M ' Y 
u3»:-..«; 05~k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, A Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, A Political 
Subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, MCDONALD'S 
CORPORATION, and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS AND'FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION 
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE, AND 
DENYING SANDY CITY'S CROSS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-03898 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The hearing on McDonald's Corporation's Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment; McDonald's 
Corporation's Amended Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; and McDonald's 
Corporation's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Appraisal of Gary 
Free came before this Court on Monday, April 10, 1989 at 10:30 
a.m. Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm and Diane H. Banks appeared on behalf 
of McDonald1s Corporation ("McDonald's"); Christopher Fuller and 
Walter Miller appeared on behalf of Sandy City ("Sandy"); and 
Kent Lewis appeared on behalf of Salt Lak£ County ("County"). 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, affidavitsf documents 
and exhibits filed by all parties on thes£ matters, having heard 
the arguments of counsel, and otherwise b$ing fully advised, 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. McDonald's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the 
ground that Sandy's action is untimely as a matter of law under 
the doctrine of laches. 
2. Alternatively, McDonald's ^nd the County's motions 
for summary judgment are granted on all of the claims asserted in 
Sandy's Verified Complaint filed herein. 
3. Sandy's claim under Section 10-2-418 of the Utah 
Code ("Section 418") fails as a matter of pLaw based on the 
undisputed facts in the record, in that: 
a. the cost or value of land is not included in 
calculating cost projections und^r Section 418 of 
the Utah Code; 
b. the cost of furnishings, equipment and 
fixtures is not included in calculating cost 
projections under Section 418 of the Utah Code; 
c. the projected and actual costs of the 
McDonald's restaurant at issue a^e less than 
$750,000.00; and 
d. Sandy City had not expressed a willingness to 
annex the property that is the subject of this 
-2-
lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit 
application was approved. 
4. As an alternative ground for granting McDonald's 
and the County's Motions for Summary Judgment, Sandy is 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues relating to 
its Section 418 claim, which were decided adversely to it in the 
litigation involving Chevron in Civil No. C87r07304. 
5. McDonald's Motion to Strike the Affidavit and 
Appraisal of Gary Free is granted as to the portions of Gary 
Free's Affidavit and Appraisal relating to the cost of equipment 
and improvements to the real property. The Court finds that the 
Affidavit and Appraisal fail to comply with Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, in that the opinions contained therein are without 
foundation and are based on inadmissible hearsay. However, in 
ruling on the merits of the pending motions, the Court has 
considered and taken into account Mr. Free's Affidavit and 
Appraisal. 
6. There are no disputes of fact with respect to 
Sandy's Title 57 Claim, Agency Claim, and Ordinance Claim (as 
those claims are identified in the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of McDonald's Motion to Dismiss or in the 
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Alternative for Summary Judgment) and the County and McDonald's 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims. 
7. Sandy's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment against 
the County and McDonald's is denied. 
8. Sandy's Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED this of April 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
ck' 
istrict Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICfe 
I hereby certify that on this / j day of April 1989, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent Lewis 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84900tl200 
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JKF.-041189C 
Christopher C. Fuller 
Durbano, Smith, Reeve & Fuller 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
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